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Abstract 
We estimate a stochastic frontier model with random inefficiency parameters, which 
allows us not only to identify the role of bank risk-taking on driving cost and profit 
inefficiency, but also to recognize heterogeneous effects of risk exposure on banks with 
different characteristics. We account for an integral group of risk exposure covariates 
including credit, liquidity, capital and market risk, as well as bank-specific 
characteristics of size and affiliation. The model is estimated for the Colombian banking 
sector during the period 2002-2012. Results suggest that risk-taking drives inefficiency 
and its omission leads to over (under) estimate cost (profit) efficiency. Risk-taking is 
also found to have different effects on efficiency of banks with different size and 
affiliation, and those involved in mergers and acquisitions. In particular, greater 
exposures to credit and market risk are found to be key profit efficiency drivers. 
Likewise, lower liquidity risk and capital risk lead to higher efficiency in both costs and 
profits. Large, foreign and merged banks benefit more when assuming credit risk, while 
small, domestic and non-merged banks institutions take advantage of assuming higher 
market risk.  
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1. Introduction
After the global financial crisis, understanding bank risk-taking has gained
more attention among researchers and practitioners. In particular, due to the reg-
ulatory framework proposed in Basel III, which is intended to limit and monitor
bank risk-taking by imposing higher capital requirements and more liquid assets
holdings in banks’ portfolios (BIS, 2010).1 These higher requirements may reduce
bank risk exposure but also force them to be more cost-efficient in order to be
profitable. In the case of emerging economies, there is an additional factor asso-
ciated to the effects of the increasing risk appetite exhibited recently by financial
institutions, which is mainly associated to higher capital inflows from advanced
economies, where financial fragility coexists with prolonged lower interest rates,
especially in the Euro area (Bruno and Song, 2013; Ahmed and Zlate, 2013). As
a result, banks from emerging economies take advantage from lower interest rates
abroad to fund mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in search of cost efficiency, while
expanding their loans and investments motivated by risk-taking incentives. Thus,
most of the financial authorities in those economies have been facing the chal-
lenges of having large banks (i.e. concentrated markets) with higher market and
credit risk exposures. In this context, the analysis of bank efficiency incorporating
risk exposure may contribute to the proper design of macroprudential policies to
enhance financial stability.
The study of bank risk-taking and its impact on banks performance has been a
recurrent issue in the literature. The seminal work of Berger and DeYoung (1997)
showed that banks with lower efficiency tend to exhibit higher ratio of bad loans
and in turn those banks are more prone to default than banks with higher effi-
ciency and lower share of bad loans. Thus, bank efficiency indicators have been
used as a potential measures of bank failures (Podpiera and Weill, 2008). Like-
wise, the modern banking theory highlights that risk-taking is an inherent element
of the banking production which should be properly modeled into the efficiency
measurement (Hughes et al., 2001). Recent studies in this field have showed that
failing to account for risk-taking leads to biased estimations of bank efficiency
as well as mislead estimates of scale economies and cost elasticities (Hughes and
Mester, 2013; Koetter, 2008; Malikov et al., 2013). However, studies that incor-
1The Basel III framework promotes higher and better-quality capital, risk coverage and lever-
age ratios to increase resilience in periods of stress. Likewise, states the introduction of a Liquidity
Coverage Ratio for short term (30 days) and a Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) for long-term
(one year), which will be implemented gradually during the 2015-2018 period according with
the evolution of the economic activity in each member country. The recent initiatives by the
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), the International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions (IOSCO) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) are also aligned to limit the risk-taking
behavior and contagion in financial market through micro and macro-prudential policies.
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porate bank risk-taking in efficiency estimations have traditionally included only
proxies of credit risk exposure (i.e. non-performing loans or loan losses provisions),
omitting other important risks faced by banks (e.g. liquidity, market and capital
exposures, among others).
Credit risk proxies are usually included into costs and profit functions as a mea-
sure of output quality that directly affects the technology (Mester, 1996; Hughes
and Mester, 1998) or as an undesirable output where reductions are desirable (see
some applications in Park and Weber, 2006; Zago and Dongili, 2011; Assaf et al.,
2013). Under that approach, risk-taking is assumed as an exogenous component
of the banking production process. This contrasts with recent empirical literature
that illustrates how most of bank inefficiency corresponds to either poor manage-
ment or riskier strategies reflected in a higher ex-post credit risk (i.e. elevated
share of NPLs) (see Lepetit et al., 2008).
When risk-taking is modeled as endogenous, we can find two approaches in
the literature: Firstly, structural models of banking production that account for
managerial risk preferences and endogenous risk-taking. In these models, bank
performance is measured in the risk-return space that incorporates the trade-off
between expected profit and risk.2 The second approach is stochastic frontier
analysis (SFA), first introduced by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den
Broeck (1977). In particular, SFA models in which firm-specific characteristics
are modeled as elements that affect the inefficiency distribution. This framework
avoids additional assumptions on banks behavior and their impact on the pro-
duction technology. Recently, Radic´ et al. (2012) applied the later approach to
assess cost and profit efficiency of G-7 investment banks. These authors included a
set of measures of risk exposure and other firm-specific and macro-related factors
and found that those variables affect the inefficiency distribution rather than the
production technology. Moreover, they identified that omitting risk-taking from
the efficiency estimation leads to underestimate profit efficiency, and that liquidity
and capital are the most relevant risk exposures explaining efficiency.
Recent literature recognizes that risk exposure may also affect banks with dif-
ferent characteristics in different ways. Foreign banks may deal better with risk
exposure given cheaper access to funding sources or more diversification (see Chen
and Liao, 2011). Similar effects could be faced by large institutions or those op-
erating in different markets, mainly associated to scale economies (Bos and Kool,
2006; Wheelock and Wilson, 2012). Moreover, recent studies show that large
banks face lower cost on both deposits and interbank funds mainly because their
creditors infer that those banks are too-important-to-fail and will be saved by the
2These models were developed by Hughes et al. (1996, 2001) and have been recently applied
by Koetter (2008).
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government in case of failure to avoid contagion into the financial system (Bertay
et al., 2013; Santos, 2014; IMF, 2014). In addition, there is evidence supporting
the fact that high-leveraged (or low capitalized) institutions tend to take more risk
when they can adjust their capital structures or in the presence of market power
(Borio and Zhu, 2012; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2011).Banks with a higher risk appetite
may choose to produce less fixed interest bearing loans and engage more in se-
curities or derivatives trading, increasing their market risk exposure. Likewise,
lower capitalized banks may increase their risk of insolvency due to credit losses
or sudden security price deterioration (Mester, 2008). Risky banks tend to attract
more deposits because creditors demand higher interest rates as a way to exert
market discipline (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). Therefore, it is relevant
not only to account for risk exposure measures as possible inefficiency drivers, but
also to recognize differences in the way risk exposure may affect different banks.
Indeed, several studies reveal that estimates of bank efficiency can be biased if
bank heterogeneity is ignored (Mester, 1996; Bos et al., 2005; Gala´n et al., 2014c;
Pestana-Barros and Williams, 2013).
In this context, our contribution to the literature is twofold. Firstly, we propose
an alternative approach to model observed and unobserved bank heterogeneity
within a Bayesian stochastic frontier framework. Secondly, we provide evidence
on the importance to properly account for the effects of risk-taking in bank effi-
ciency estimations. Particulary, we present a novel stochastic frontier model with
random inefficiency coefficients, which is able to identify not only the effects of
observed covariates in the inefficiency but also the type of banks that are more
affected by each of these characteristics. This specification for the inefficiency may
capture unobserved heterogeneity sources related to risk exposure among banks.
Thus the proposed specification allows us to identify the role of risk-taking on
driving inefficiency and different effects of risk-taking on the efficiency of banks
involved in M&A and banks with different size and affiliation. We account for an
integral group of risk exposure covariates (i.e. risks of credit, liquidity, capital, and
market). Unlike previous studies, we use internal loan ratings as measure of ex-ante
credit risk which is a more accurate indicator than the traditional NPLs measure
that captures ex-post realizations of credit risk. The inference of the model is
carried out via Bayesian methods that allows to formally incorporate parameter
uncertainty and to derive posterior densities of cost and profit efficiency for each
bank. We compare our proposed random coefficients specification to models with
fixed coefficients, with risk exposure variables in the frontier and omitting risk-
taking measures. We identify that risk-taking has a different impact on cost and
profit efficiency of each bank depending on their specific characteristics. To the
best of our knowledge, our proposal constitutes the first SFA model that incorpo-
rates risk-taking within a Bayesian framework and that accounts for firm-specific
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effects of covariates in the inefficiency.
The proposed model is estimated for the Colombian banking sector using bank-
level-data for the period 2002-2012 and provides the first empirical evidence on the
effects of risk-taking on the efficiency of the Colombian banking industry. Results
are important given that as other emerging economies, the Colombian banking
sector has experienced a growing expansion in recent years. During this period,
the value of loans has grown 300% and the ratio investments to assets have doubled
their share. Likewise, several M&A processes have been carried out, concentrating
financial services in few but large institutions. As a result, risk exposure has
presented important increases.3 This has led regulators to monitor closely credit
and market risks and to face the challenges of having systemic financial institutions
(?Leo´n et al., 2012). Recent studies on efficiency of the Colombian banking sector
have evidenced an improvement on technical efficiency and productivity change
among banks. However, none of these studies have yet incorporated the impact of
risk-taking on efficiency, which plays a major role for explaining banks performance
within a risk-production environment.
The rest of the paper contains five additional sections. In Section 2 we present
a review of literature on bank risk-taking and efficiency. In Section 3, we present
the proposed specification, the Bayesian inference for this model and some model
comparison criteria. In Section 4, we describe the data and the empirical model.
In Section 5 we present and analyze the main results of the application to the
Colombian banking sector. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Risk-taking and bank efficiency
The seminal study of Berger and DeYoung (1997) postulated intuitive hypothe-
ses to explain the relationship among bank risk-taking, equity capital and bank
efficiency. On the one hand, they defined a bad management hypothesis which
states that poor managed banks face higher operative costs and may have difficul-
ties in their evaluation of credit risk. As a result, lower efficiency may causes an
increase of NPLs. On the contrary, the bad luck hypothesis argues that because of
adverse economic conditions (beyond the banks control) bad loans may increase
and then banks have to expend more resources to recover them. Thus, an increase
of risky loans leads banks to employ more resources for monitoring loans and
then to lower their cost efficiency. Similarly, they suggest that skimping on loan
3In May of 2013 the Colombian Treasury Bills (TES) prices decreased 20% in two weeks as
a result of the uncertainty related to the FED’s exit strategy. This downward led to bank losses
of COP 2,32 billion that represent 4.87% of their equity capital (BR, 2013).
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monitoring and the presence of moral hazard incentives (because of lower capital-
ization) are also associated to higher ex-post credit risk and risk-taking incentives,
respectively. They use Granger causality tests to model the inter-temporal rela-
tionship among these measures of efficiency, risk and capital. Overall, they find
that there is a negative relation between cost efficiency and credit risk in the U.S.
failed banks. Likewise, they show that highly capitalized banks are more efficient
than thinly capitalized banks. Thus, one direct consequence of these results is
that banks should enhance capital equity and that efficiency may constitutes an
important indicator of potential bank failures.
Recent studies provide evidence on these hypothesis for the banking sector
in European and emerging economies by using alternative approaches to identify
inter-temporal relationships among efficiency, risk and capital. Most of them show
that because of banks can choose their level of operating costs, monitoring cots
and capitalization to manage their level of risk exposure (e.g. adequate proportion
of riskier loans), the consequences of a bad management or higher risk-taking, by
skimping or moral hazard incentives, would lead to both inefficiency and higher
bad loans (see Williams, 2004; Altunbas et al., 2007; Lepetit et al., 2008; Podpiera
and Weill, 2008; Tabak et al., 2011).In general, they find a negative relationship
between NPLs and cost efficiency and concur that banking supervisors should
focus on enhancing bank cost efficiency and bank capital in order to reduce the
probability of bank failures and to support financial stability objectives. However,
little is known about how differences in risk exposure affect the efficiency of banks
with different characteristics. The efficiency frontier models can be used to address
this issue.
2.2. Frontier efficiency methods and bank risk-taking
Under frontier efficiency analysis bank risk-taking can be modeled as a compo-
nent of the technology or as a factor that influence the inefficiency. The traditional
approach used by most studies on bank efficiency is to incorporate credit risk into
the production function as a bad output where reductions are desirable. This
method, in which loan losses (the proxy of ex-post credit risk) are included as an
undesirable output that affects the production process, was initially introduced in
Berg et al. (1992). Other studies have followed the same approach using the share
of NPLs as a measure of credit risk exposure and alternative cost functions or in-
put distance functions (Mester, 1996; Hughes and Mester, 1998; Park and Weber,
2006; Zago and Dongili, 2011; Barros et al., 2012; Assaf et al., 2013).
Recent developments in banking theory and production economics include risk-
taking as a determinant of bank performance by assuming that banks incorporate
credit risk into their expected production plans. These structural models were
developed by Hughes et al. (1996) and extended by Hughes et al. (2001) under
the managerial utility maximizing approach by employing an almost ideal demand
6
system from the consumer theory. In this framework, bank performance account
for the risk-return trade-off by computing a risk-return efficiency measure. (see
Altunbas et al., 2000; Koetter, 2008; Hughes and Mester, 2013, for studies on
scale, cost and profit efficiency adjusted by risk-return for the banking industries
of Japan, Germany, and the U.S, respectively). These studies find that efficiency
measures adjusted by risk-return are lower than those computed in standard mod-
els given that banks choose their optimal risk-return trade-offs, and they remark
that risk-taking play a major role in explaining bank efficiency.
In recent stochastic frontier applications, bank risk exposure has been treated
as an environmental factor that can be modeled according with its influence on the
production process or the inefficiency distribution. Radic´ et al. (2012) follow the
general approach proposed by Coelli et al. (1999) to test the impact of several risks
and market conditions on the cost and profit efficiency of investment banks.4 The
authors evaluate a sample of 800 banks of the G-7 countries during the period 2001-
2007 and find that measures of risk-taking influence the inefficiency distribution
rather than the bank technology (see Glass and McKillop, 2006, for evidence using
this approach for large credit unions in the U.S.). They also find that omitting bank
risk-taking from the efficiency estimation leads to underestimate profit efficiency.
In particular, liquidity and capital risk exposures are found to be the most relevant
factors.
The mentioned studies that incorporate risk into efficiency estimation focuses
only on credit risk exposure, usually by including NPLs as an undesiderable output.
However, banks face other important risks that affect their performance, which
have been less explored in the literature of bank efficiency. Liquidity risk is an
essential risk that reflects the typical maturity mismatch of banks because of their
business of borrow short (take deposits from savers) and lend long (assign loans
to borrowers). Similarly, traditional measures of market risk exposure such as
securities over total assets and capital risk exposure (equity capital over total
assets) may help to capture market and regulatory conditions that affects banks
performance. These risks have been incorporated in estimations of cost and profit
functions in some studies showing its importance on bank performance (Altunbas
et al., 2000; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Brissimis et al., 2008; Lepetit et al., 2008).
Overall, banks face different types of risks that influence their performance, and
they should be accounted for in bank efficiency measurements.
4Coelli et al. (1999) test a model including heterogeneity or environmental factors into the
production function and one including them in the inefficiency distribution against a model with
effects in both parts.
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2.3. Evidence from the Colombian banking sector
The efficiency of the Colombian banking sector has been widely studied because
of two main reasons: firstly, the increase on M&A in the banking industry as a
result of the growing affluence of capital flows from advanced and other emerging
economies. Secondly, regulatory purposes trying to identify micro and macro pru-
dential measures to reduce bank default episodes and to mitigate contagion among
financial institutions.5
Some studies have applied the standard stochastic frontier approach using al-
ternatively Cobb-Douglas or translog functions to characterize the technology and
find evidence of low cost efficiency during the 90’s (Estrada and Osorio, 2004;
Clavijo et al., 2006). The most recent studies for the Colombian banking sec-
tor find a general improvement of both technical and cost efficiency along with a
greater heterogeneity among banks. Sarmiento et al. (2013) use a non-parametric
frontier model to evaluate the efficiency of Colombian banks for the period 2000-
2009. They found that technical efficiency gradually improved during the decade
up to the global financial crisis of 2008-09, when all estimated measures of effi-
ciency decreased and a negative productivity change was found. Further, a high
heterogeneity in efficiency scores was observed among banks irrespective of their
size and affiliation, and M&A were found to have a significant and positive impact
on bank efficiency for merged or acquired banks.
For the same period, Gala´n et al. (2014c) estimated input-oriented technical
efficiency using a dynamic Bayesian SFA model. They find that foreign owner-
ship has positive and persistent effects on efficiency, while the effects of size are
positive but rapidly adjusted. They also identified high inefficiency persistence in
Colombian banks with important differences between institutions. In particular,
merged banks were found to exhibit low costs of adjustment that allow them to
recover rapidly the efficiency losses derived from merging processes.
Moreno and Estrada (2013) studied the role of market power in explaining effi-
ciency gains in Colombian banks during the 2004-2012 period. By using alternative
SFA and non-parametric models, they found that there is a positive relationship
between market power and efficiency, which is explained by the product differen-
tiation that allows banks to gain in efficiency while they do not charge excessive
credit prices.
However, none of these studies have yet incorporated the role of bank risk-
taking on the banking production to estimate efficiency.
5Several bank regulatory measures were adopted by the end of nineties as a result of the
Mexican and Asian crisis that also affected the Colombian banking sector (see Clavijo et al., 2006,
for a detailed review on the evolution of M&A, regulation and performance of the Colombian
banking industry during the regional and local financial crises).
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3. Methodology
3.1. A stochastic frontier model with random inefficiency coefficients
Distinguishing inefficiency from heterogeneity is an important issue in the ef-
ficiency frontier literature. Omitting heterogeneity variables has been identified
to lead to biased estimations of inefficiency. In the banking literature, Bos et al.
(2009) identify important effects of observed heterogeneity on efficiency levels and
rankings, while Feng and Zhang (2012) find that failure to consider unobserved
heterogeneity results in misled efficiency rankings and mismeasured technical ef-
ficiency, productivity growth, and returns to scale. Observed and unobserved
heterogeneity sources are important to be considered. In the first case, covariates
are usually included either in the frontier or in the parameters of the inefficiency
distribution (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, for a complete review). In the sec-
ond case, unobserved heterogeneity has been mainly modeled in the frontier and
then, assumed to distinguish firms because of differences in the technology rather
than in the inefficiency. Greene (2005) proposes different methods to deal with
this kind of heterogeneity under the frequentist approach.
In the Bayesian context, Tsionas (2002) proposes a model with random coeffi-
cients in the frontier, which captures different effects of technology factors for every
firm. The modeling of these unobserved sources of heterogeneity in the inefficiency
has been less explored. Recently, Gala´n et al. (2014b) propose the inclusion of a
random parameter that can be modeled along other observed covariates and which
is found to perform well in capturing latent heterogeneity. However, here we are
more interested in studying different effects of observed heterogeneity variables
(i.e. risk exposure) in the inefficiency of banks with different characteristics. That
is, a similar approach to that of Tsionas (2002) but including random coefficients
in the covariates of the inefficiency distribution rather than in the frontier.
The proposed stochastic frontier model is the following:
yit = xitβ − uit + vit
vit ∼ N(0, σ2v)
uit ∼ Exp(λit)
λit = exp
((
γ
γ∗i
)′(
zit 0
0 z∗it
))
,
(1)
where yit represents the output for firm i at time t, xit is a row vector that contains
the input quantities, β is a vector of parameters, vit is an idiosyncratic error
assumed to follow a normal distribution, and uit is the inefficiency component. The
inefficiency is assumed to follow an exponential distribution with a firm specific
and time-varying parameter λit, which depends on a vector including two sets of
parameters and a matrix that includes two types of heterogeneity variables. γ is a
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vector of parameters which are common to all firms, including the constant; and,
γ∗i is a vector of firm-specific parameters intended to capture differences in the
effects of covariates across firms on the inefficiency. Therefore, zit is a vector of
heterogeneity variables whose effects are assumed to be constant across firms, and
z∗it contains a set of heterogeneity variables with firm-specific effects. In the case
of assessing cost or profit efficiency, yit would represent costs or profits, and for
the cost efficiency case the sign of the inefficiency component is reversed.
The random specification for the inefficiency coefficients is intended to capture
differences in the way risk exposure affects cost and profit efficiency of different
types of banks. Thus, the model is able to identify, not only the effects of observed
covariates in the inefficiency, but also the type of banks that are more affected by
each of these characteristics.
3.2. Bayesian inference
The inference of the model is carried out using Bayesian methods. This ap-
proach was introduced in stochastic frontier models by van den Broeck et al. (1994)
and allows us to formally incorporate parameter uncertainty and to derive poste-
rior densities of cost and profit efficiency for every individual bank.
We assume proper but relatively disperse prior distributions throughout. In
particular, the distributions assumed for the parameters in the frontier are: β ∼
N(0,Σβ) where Σ
−1
β is a precision diagonal matrix with priors set to 0.001 for all
coefficients. The variance of the idiosyncratic error term is inverse gamma, that
is equivalent to σ−2v ∼ G(aσ−2v , bσ−2v ) with priors set to 0.01 for the shape and rate
parameters, respectively.
Regarding the inefficiency component, its distribution is assumed to be expo-
nential: uit|γ,γ∗, zit, z∗it ∼ Exp(exp(zitγ + z∗itγ∗i )). The prior distribution of the
vector of common parameters γ is chosen to be centered in a given prior mean effi-
ciency value r∗ following the procedure in Griffin and Steel (2007), where exp(γ) ∼
Exp(− ln r∗). For the firm-specific inefficiency heterogeneity coefficients, a hier-
archical structure is defined, where exp(γ∗i ) ∼ Exp(γ∗), and γ∗ ∼ Exp(− ln r∗).
Therefore, the firm-specific parameters are centered a priori in a common param-
eter, which at its turn, is centered in a given prior mean efficiency value. In this
particular application, r∗ is set at 0.65, following other Bayesian SFA studies in
banking (see Marzec and Osiewalski, 2001; Tabak and Tecles, 2010). Sensitivity
analysis is performed to the use of a normal prior distribution for the inefficiency
parameters such that γ is N(0,Σγ) with priors for the diagonal precision matrix
Σ−1γ equal to 0.1 for all the coefficients.
6 In this case, the hierarchical structure
used for the firm-specific parameters is: γ∗i ∼ N(γ∗,Σγ∗) where γ∗ is defined in
6This centers efficiencies in a value of 0.37.
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the same way that γ. Results show convergence to roughly the same values after
the number of iterations described below.
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods and in particular the Gibbs
Sampling algorithm with data augmentation, as presented by Koop et al. (1995)
for stochastic frontier models, can be used here.7 The MCMC algorithm involves
50.000 iterations where the first 10.000 are discarded and a thinning equal to 4
is used to remove autocorrelations. Therefore, 10.000 iterations are used for the
posterior inference.
We assess the fit and predictive performance of the different models using
a version of the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) called DIC3 and the Log
Predictive Score (LPS) (see Griffin and Steel, 2004; Ferreira and Steel, 2007; Gala´n
et al., 2014b; Gala´n and Pollitt, 2014a, for applications of these criteria to Bayesian
SFA models). The former is a stable variant of the within sample measure of fit
introduced by Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) commonly used in Bayesian analysis.
Defining the deviance of a model with parameters θ as D(θ) = −2 log f(y|θ),
where y are the data, then DIC = 2D(θ)−D(θ¯). However, using an estimator of
the density f(y|θ) instead of the posterior mean θ¯ is more stable. This alternative
specification was first proposed by Richardson (2002) and presented by Celeux
et al. (2006) to overcome problems when the original DIC is implemented to
random effects and mixture models.8 The formulation for this criterion is:
DIC3 = −4Eθ[log f(y|θ)|y] + 2 log f̂ (y) (2)
Regarding LPS, it is a criterion for evaluating the out-of-sample behaviour
of different models. This criterion was first introduced by Good (1952) and is
intended to examine model performance by comparing its predictive distribution
with out-of-sample observations. For this purpose the sample is split into a training
and a prediction set. Our prediction set consists of observations corresponding to
the last two observed years of every firm in the sample, and the training set contains
all the rest. The formula is the following:
LPS = −1
k
k∑
i=1
log f(yi,ti|previous data), (3)
where yi,ti represents the observations in the predictive set for the k firms in the
sample and ti represents the penultimate time point with observed data for firm i.
7The implementation of our models is carried out using the WinBUGS package (see Griffin
and Steel, 2007, for a general procedure).
8Li et al. (2012) also remark on the lack of robustness of the original DIC in models with data
augmentation
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4. Data and empirical model
We employ annual data from 31 commercial banks for the period 2002-2012.
This is an unbalanced panel data set from the local central bank (Banco de la
Repu´blica) and the financial supervisory agency (Superintendencia Financiera de
Colombia). We follow the financial intermediation approach in which banks employ
deposits, labor and physical capital to produce loans, securities investments and
other financial services (Berger, 2007).9 We consider as input prices: the price of
deposits (p1), which is the ratio of interest expenses divided by total deposits; the
price of labor (p2), which is personnel expenses divided by the total number of
employees, and the price of physical capital (p3), which is calculated as the ratio
of operating expenses (i.e. non-interest reduced by personnel) to total fixed assets.
As outputs we consider: loans (y1) including consumer, commercial, mortgage, and
microcredit; securities (y2), which includes public and private bonds holdings, and
other securities investments; and off-balance-sheet (OBS) activities (y3) measured
as the ratio of non-interest income over total income. Non-interest income includes
securitization, brokerage services, and management of financial assets for clients
which represent an important source of income for Colombian banks.10 Total costs
are considered as the sum of interest and non-interest costs and total profit as the
earned net profit.
We define a set of bank-specific characteristics including: size (z1), measured
as the level of total assets; and foreign ownership (z2), which is a binary variable
taking the value of 1 if more than 50% of bank shares are foreign owned, and
0 otherwise. As aforementioned, these effects have been found to be relevant
inefficiency drivers in previous studies.
Additionally, we include several specific measures of credit, liquidity, capital
and market risk according to recent literature, the Colombian financial regulation
and the Basel III standards. Credit risk (z∗1) is measured as risky loans over total
loans. We use risky loans instead of NPLs because it is a measure of ex-ante credit
risk assumed by banks when they assign loans, which is based on internal loan
ratings associated to their probability of default.11 In addition, the regulation
establishes that loan losses provisions are required for each loan according with
its rating. Thus, higher credit risk exposure is associated to more provisions for
potential loan losses. As we mentioned before, the use of NPLs in the estimation
9Hughes and Mester (1993) provide evidence that confirm that deposits should be treated as
inputs (see Sealey and Lindley, 1977, for a discussion on the intermediation approach).
10In a recent study, Tabak and Tecles (2010) find that omitting OBS as an output over (under)
estimate cost (profit) efficiency results.
11This measure of ex-ante credit risk has been used in the literature to identify bank risk-taking
in the credit market (Ioannidou and Penas, 2010).
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of bank efficiency may lead to biased estimates of bank technology (Malikov et
al, 2013). Liquidity (z∗2) is measured as liquid assets over total assets.
12 Higher
liquid assets prevent banks from losses due to rapid price deterioration and also for
the maturity mismatch. Capital risk exposure (z∗3) is measured as capital equity
over total assets. Capital risk is considered as a proxy for regulatory conditions
that may affect bank inefficiency. Lower capitalization is usually associated to
higher inefficiency.13 Finally, market risk exposure (z∗4) is measured as securities
investments over total assets. Operating costs associated to securities investments
are generally lower that those involved in monitoring and assessing of loans which
may induce less efficient banks to engage on more securities investments. However,
higher holdings of securities by banks also entail higher market risk exposure.
Table 1 exhibits the summary statistics of the main variables described above,
where all monetary values are expressed in thousands of U.S. dollars at constant
prices of year 2012.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Total loans 3,342,012 4,206,436 11,553 28,267,020
Securities 1,265,349 1,339,794 563 6,461,458
OBS 0.0354 0.0299 0.0266 0.0587
Price of deposits 0.0248 0.0121 0.0009 0.0923
Price of labour 36.44 22.30 3.13 142.03
Price of capital 1.92 2.66 0.29 17.30
Total assets 5,503,680 6,425,746 39,699 41,786,469
Credit risk exposure 0.0988 0.0667 0.0019 0.3839
Liquidity risk exposure 0.2296 0.0667 0.0019 0.3839
Capital risk exposure 0.1211 0.0757 0.0448 0.7854
Market risk exposure 0.2381 0.1368 0.0013 0.7478
Total cost 1,132,776 1,402,621 15,673 7,722,227
Total profit 76,927 377,974 - 784,642 2,809,771
Source: Colombian central bank and financial supervisory agency.
We evaluate cost and profit efficiency for the Colombian banking sector. Thus,
we use cost and profit functions for the frontier specification in (1), and we repre-
sent them with translog multi-product functions. The estimated model is:
12Liquid assets include cash holdings, negotiable and available to sell public and private debt
instruments and pledged collateral in repurchase agreement operations.
13We use both Tier I and Tier II capital requirements as measure of capital equity.
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ln cit = β0 +
∑3
m=1 βm ln ymit +
∑2
r=1 δr ln prit +
1
2
∑3
m=1
∑3
n=1 βmn ln ymit ln ynit
+1
2
∑2
r=1
∑2
s=1 δrs ln prit ln psit +
∑3
m=1
∑2
r=1 ηmr ln ymit ln prit + κ1 t
+1
2
κ2 t
2 +
∑3
m=1 φmt ln ymit +
∑2
r=1 ϕrt ln prit +
∑4
j=1 ωjz
∗
jit
+ vit + uit
vit ∼ N(0, σ2v)
uit ∼ exp(λit)
λit = exp(γ0 +
∑2
h=1 γhzhit +
∑4
j=1 γ
∗
ji
z∗jit),
(4)
where cit is the total cost or the total profit, y are outputs, p are input prices and
t is a time trend in order to account for technological change. Linear homogeneity
of the cost function is achieved by normalizing total costs and input prices by
the price of capital (p3). We include two types of heterogeneity variables: i) those
related to size (z1) and foreign ownership (z2), which are modeled in the inefficiency
distribution and have common effects to all banks; and, ii) those capturing banks
risk-exposure (z∗1 , z
∗
2 , z
∗
3 , z
∗
4), which may be included either in the frontier or in the
inefficiency. In the latter case, they are able to be modeled either with common
or firm-specific effects on banks inefficiency. In order to overcome the problem
of calculations of logarithms of negative profits, we correct profit values by a
factor corresponding to the absolute value of the lowest profit plus one (see Tecles
and Tabak, 2010). Symmetry of the cross-effects is accomplished by imposing
βmn = βnm, δrs = δsr.
5. Results
From the general model in (4) we estimate four models intended to evaluate
cost efficiency (C1 to C4) and four models assessing profit efficiency (P1 to P4).
Models C1 and P1 do not include any risk-exposure variable, so ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4 = 0
and γ∗1i, γ
∗
2i, γ
∗
3i, γ
∗
4i = 0. Models C2 and P2 include the risk-exposure variables only
in the frontier and then γ∗1i, γ
∗
2i, γ
∗
3i, γ
∗
4i = 0. Models C3 and P3 include the risk
covariates only in the inefficiency but restrict them to have a common effect on the
inefficiency of all banks; thus, ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4 = 0 and γ
∗
1i, γ
∗
2i, γ
∗
3i, γ
∗
4i = γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2 , γ
∗
3 , γ
∗
4 .
Finally, our proposed specification to model random inefficiency coefficients is
estimated in models C4 and P4 (ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4 = 0). This allows the effects of risk
exposure to be different among banks.
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Table 2: Posterior mean and 95% probability intervals of parameter distributions in cost models
Model C1 Model C2 Model C3 Model C4
No risk Risk in frontier Risk in inefficiency Random coefficients
Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI
Frontier
β0 5.656 [4.457, 6.995] 6.183 [4.998, 7.337] 5.879 [4.918, 6.876] 5.344 [4.101, 6.739]
β1 y1 0.053 [0.002, 0.138] 0.132 [0.055, 0.188] 0.029 [0.004, 0.062] 0.087 [0.004, 0.175]
β2 y2 0.093 [0.002, 0.218] 0.099 [0.009, 0.251] 0.079 [0.007, 0.217] 0.040 [0.002, 0.108]
β3 y3 0.048 [0.002, 0.118] 0.032 [0.001, 0.074] 0.052 [0.004, 0.109] 0.057 [0.002, 0.181]
β11 y
2
1 0.071 [0.019, 0.128] 0.124 [0.073, 0.174] 0.078 [0.029, 0.129] 0.087 [-0.003, 0.160]
β12 y1y2 0.019 [-0.038, 0.069] -0.075 [-0.133, -0.018] 0.012 [-0.039, 0.059] 0.002 [-0.069, 0.084]
β13 y1y3 -0.005 [-0.011, 0.001] -0.001 [-0.007, 0.004] -0.004 [-0.009, 0.001] -0.003 [-0.009, 0.003]
β22 y
2
2 0.012 [-0.035, 0.059] 0.122 [0.058, 0.184] 0.016 [-0.026, 0.058] 0.003 [-0.075, 0.069]
β23 y2y3 0.002 [-0.002, 0.006] -0.001 [-0.005, 0.002] 0.002 [-0.002, 0.005] 0.001 [-0.003, 0.005]
β33 y
2
3 0.001 [-0.001, 0.003] 0.001 [-0.001, 0.002] 0.001 [-0.001, 0.003] 0.001 [-0.001, 0.003]
δ1 p1 0.154 [0.005, 0.435] 0.244 [0.005, 0.516] 0.148 [0.011, 0.359] 0.096 [0.003, 0.285]
δ2 p2 0.180 [0.007, 0.618] 0.113 [0.004, 0.248] 0.173 [0.013, 0.409] 0.152 [0.005, 0.472]
δ11 p
2
1 0.219 [0.086, 0.322] 0.136 [-0.014, 0.254] 0.186 [0.058, 0.288] 0.039 [-0.157, 0.217]
δ12 p1p2 -0.221 [-0.301, -0.132] -0.165 [-0.247, -0.076] -0.206 [-0.277, -0.129] -0.147 [-0.255, -0.034]
δ22 p
2
2 0.201 [0.098, 0.301] 0.120 [0.018, 0.221] 0.186 [0.098, 0.272] 0.183 [0.075, 0.281]
η11 y1p1 0.151 [0.099, 0.201] 0.140 [0.089, 0.189] 0.149 [0.104, 0.193] 0.162 [0.089, 0.233]
η12 y1p2 -0.029 [-0.077, 0.015] -0.022 [-0.062, 0.019] -0.029 [-0.068, 0.011] -0.035 [-0.093, 0.028]
η21 y2p1 -0.017 [-0.074, 0.027] -0.047 [-0.097, 0.001] -0.028 [-0.086, 0.016] -0.098 [-0.170, -0.023]
η22 y2p2 -0.084 [-0.129, -0.037] -0.052 [-0.095, -0.009] -0.075 [-0.117, -0.032] -0.044 [-0.101, 0.013]
η31 y3p1 0.001 [-0.006, 0.009] 0.001 [-0.005, 0.007] 0.002 [-0.004, 0.008] 0.003 [-0.003, 0.012]
η32 y3p2 0.004 [-0.004, 0.010] 0.005 [-0.001, 0.011] 0.002 [-0.004, 0.008] -0.002 [-0.010, 0.006]
κ1 t -0.346 [-0.595, -0.098] -0.362 [-0.575, -0.151] -0.359 [-0.567, -0.149] -0.309 [-0.526, -0.098]
κ2 t
2 0.002 [-0.007, 0.011] -0.001 [-0.010, 0.008] 0.002 [-0.005, 0.009] 0.005 [-0.003, 0.013]
φ1 ty1 0.036 [0.014, 0.059] 0.036 [0.016, 0.055] 0.037 [0.018, 0.056] 0.036 [0.018, 0.056]
φ2 ty2 -0.034 [-0.051, -0.018] -0.030 [-0.045, -0.015] -0.035 [-0.049, -0.021] -0.036 [-0.049, -0.021]
φ3 ty3 0.001 [-0.001, 0.002] 0.000 [-0.001, 0.001] 0.000 [-0.001, 0.001] -0.001 [-0.001, 0.001]
ϕ1 tp1 -0.040 [-0.068, -0.012] -0.042 [-0.068, -0.016] -0.042 [-0.065, -0.018] -0.039 [-0.065, -0.013]
ϕ2 tp2 0.017 [-0.007, 0.041] 0.011 [-0.009, 0.032] 0.017 [-0.003, 0.036] 0.009 [-0.011, 0.031]
ω1 z
∗
1(cred.) 0.134 [-0.553, 0.835]
ω2 z
∗
2(liq.) -0.188 [-0.590, 0.215]
ω3 z
∗
3(cap.) 0.734 [-0.107, 1.536]
ω4 z
∗
4(mkt.) -1.090 [-2.119, 0.001]
Inefficiency
γ0 1.035 [0.014, 0.059] 0.532 [-1.743, 2.083] 0.895 [-0.439, 2.074] 1.009 [-0.537, 2.218]
γ1 z1 -0.198 [-0.291, -0.082] -0.173 [-0.271, -0.056] -0.232 [-0.347, -0.114] -0.156 [-0.338, -0.009]
γ2 z2 -0.814 [-1.958, -0.094] -1.170 [-4.274, -0.026] -0.687 [-1.650, -0.014] -0.192 [-0.256, -0.096]
γ∗1 z
∗
1(cred.) 0.201 [-1.807, 1.728] -0.001 [-2.781, 1.852]
γ∗2 z
∗
2(liq.) 0.369 [-0.722, 1.411] 0.485 [-1.646, 1.961]
γ∗3 z
∗
3(cap.) 1.538 [0.446, 2.423] 3.181 [0.307, 6.780]
γ∗4 z
∗
4(mkt.) 0.043 [-1.875, 1.504] -0.017 [-2.054, 1.635]
Eff. 0.893 0.909 0.892 0.710
DIC3 2982.76 2916.44 2497.59 2007.75
LPS -9.62 -29.34 -65.19 -90.67
Note: Values for γ∗1 to γ
∗
4 in Model C4 correspond to the hyperparameter
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Table 3: Posterior mean and 95% probability intervals of parameter distributions in profit models
Model P1 Model P2 Model P3 Model P4
No risk Risk in frontier Risk in inefficiency Random coefficients
Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI
Frontier
β0 9.789 [-3.249,24.840] 9.873 [-6.084,23.52] 3.698 [-9.591,20.04] 7.205 [-1.754,18.03]
β1 y1 3.025 [0.6511,5.195] 3.495 [1.263,5.555] 4.031 [1.639,6.182] 2.914 [1.242,4.282]
β2 y2 3.391 [1.609,5.336] 4.122 [2.310,5.757] 4.586 [2.841,6.214] 3.538 [2.436,4.606]
β3 y3 -0.199 [-0.391,0.013] -0.218 [-0.418,0.030] -0.261 [-0.436,0.064] -0.212 [-0.339,0.077]
β11 y
2
1 -0.457 [-0.713,-0.201] -0.566 [-0.774,-0.301] -0.511 [-0.775,-0.251] -0.399 [-0.584,-0.171]
β12 y1y2 0.267 [0.0725,0.459] 0.384 [0.189,0.557] 0.307 [0.092,0.515] 0.231 [0.052,0.388]
β13 y1y3 0.017 [0.0024,0.033] 0.018 [0.001,0.032] 0.015 [0.004,0.027] 0.013 [0.003,0.023]
β22 y
2
2 0.010 [-0.108,0.146] -0.078 [-0.198,0.081] 0.029 [-0.107,0.183] 0.048 [-0.071,0.195]
β23 y2y3 -0.003 [-0.019,0.013] -0.005 [-0.015,0.004] -0.001 [-0.013,0.010] 0.001 [-0.005,0.008]
β33 y
2
3 0.001 [-0.003,0.004] 0.002 [-0.002,0.006] 0.001 [-0.002,0.004] -0.001 [-0.004,0.000]
δ1 p1 -1.678 [-4.807,2.347] -2.966 [-6.609,0.055] -4.381 [-7.473,-0.846] -3.307 [-5.343,-1.122]
δ2 p2 0.820 [-1.730,3.045] 1.633 [-0.616,4.027] 2.272 [-0.244,4.200] 1.645 [-0.389,2.898]
δ11 p
2
1 0.179 [-0.141,0.571] 0.102 [-0.149,0.423] -0.029 [-0.301,0.264] -0.043 [-0.253,0.171]
δ12 p1p2 -0.001 [-0.372,0.318] 0.044 [-0.257,0.281] 0.095 [-0.182,0.331] 0.083 [-0.075,0.235]
δ22 p
2
2 -0.077 [-0.443,0.343] -0.174 [-0.488,0.222] -0.150 [-0.419,0.177] -0.204 [-0.381,-0.031]
η11 y1p1 0.170 [-0.110,0.416] 0.245 [0.012,0.497] 0.319 [0.015,0.547] 0.235 [0.072,0.394]
η12 y1p2 0.123 [-0.071,0.319] 0.063 [-0.137,0.237] 0.036 [-0.144,0.223] 0.111 [-0.009,0.226]
η21 y2p1 0.005 [-0.115,0.140] -0.004 [-0.114,0.096] -0.044 [-0.154,0.075] -0.030 [-0.107,0.044]
η22 y2p2 -0.124 [-0.272,0.008] -0.095 [-0.224,0.029] -0.090 [-0.207,0.028] -0.114 [-0.188,-0.034]
η31 y3p1 -0.009 [-0.029,0.017] -0.012 [-0.036,0.009] -0.016 [-0.033,0.005] -0.009 [-0.020,0.003]
η32 y3p2 -0.006 [-0.023,0.013] 0.001 [-0.017,0.024] 0.004 [-0.014,0.020] -0.003 [-0.014,0.008]
κ1 t -0.336 [-1.018,0.411] -0.363 [-0.941,0.216] -0.543 [-1.096,0.015] -0.511 [-0.849,-0.169]
κ2 t
2 0.007 [-0.013,0.028] 0.003 [-0.014,0.022] -0.005 [-0.019,0.010] -0.001 [-0.011,0.009]
φ1 ty1 0.066 [0.010,0.119] 0.059 [0.004,0.110] 0.083 [0.033,0.127] 0.078 [0.043,0.109]
φ2 ty2 -0.023 [-0.055,0.014] -0.016 [-0.045,0.020] -0.022 [-0.049,0.009] -0.030 [-0.051,-0.009]
φ3 ty3 -0.003 [-0.007,0.000] -0.003 [-0.006,0.000] -0.002 [-0.006,0.000] -0.002 [-0.003,-0.001]
ϕ1 tp1 0.049 [-0.021,0.128] 0.034 [-0.023,0.102] 0.044 [-0.010,0.101] 0.024 [-0.008,0.057]
ϕ2 tp2 -0.054 [-0.136,0.030] -0.047 [-0.113,0.009] -0.052 [-0.107,0.005] -0.044 [-0.073,-0.013]
ω1 z
∗
1(cred.) -0.757 [-2.004,0.522]
ω2 z
∗
2(liq.) -1.149 [-1.943,0.321]
ω3 z
∗
3(cap.) -0.468 [-1.911,1.134]
ω4 z
∗
4(mkt.) 0.124 [-1.666,1.888]
Inefficiency
γ0 -0.967 [-2.439,0.306] -1.453 [-3.093,0.224] -1.224 [-3.244,0.625] -1.414 [-3.681,0.546]
γ1 z1 0.056 [0.022,0.149] 0.083 [0.019,0.180] 0.072 [0.031,0.164] 0.141 [0.004,0.276]
γ2 z2 1.012 [0.687,1.359] 1.133 [0.753,1.519] 1.041 [0.680,1.395] 1.018 [0.270,1.728]
γ∗1 z
∗
1(cred.) -3.261 [-5.328,-1.242] -1.015 [-1.702,-0.609]
γ∗2 z
∗
2(liq.) 0.245 [-0.662,1.160] 0.991 [-0.241,2.072]
γ∗3 z
∗
3(cap.) 1.618 [0.627,2.467] 0.958 [0.056,1.823]
γ∗4 z
∗
4(mkt.) -0.928 [-1.914,0.045] -0.822 [-1.927,0.036]
Eff. 0.515 0.531 0.507 0.641
DIC3 3168.01 3085.10 2466.83 2368.70
LPS -180.01 -282.42 -305.94 -401.56
Note: Values for γ∗1 to γ
∗
4 in Model P4 correspond to the hyperparameter
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Results of the models using both the cost and profit functions derived from (4)
are presented in tables 2 and 3, where posterior means and probability intervals
are presented for all the parameters. We observe that loans, investments and OBS
affect cost positively in all models as well as input prices. In the case of profits,
the relationship is also positive for loans and investments but negative, although
not significant, for OBS. This result for OBS was also found by Tabak and Tecles
(2010) in an application to the Indian banking sector. However, they found loans
and investments to be not significant when OBS is included in both cost and profit
models. Regarding input prices the coefficients are not relevant in any of the profit
models.
We also found decreasing returns to scale in all the models, which may suggest
low margin for more M&A processes in the sector. We analyze scale economies by
groups of banks with similar characteristics of size, ownership, and involvement
in M&A. We find that while large, domestic and merged institutions operate at
decreasing returns to scale; small, foreign and non-merged banks exhibit increasing
returns to scale.14 These results coincide with those reported by Gala´n et al.
(2014c) which suggests that M&A processes carried out mainly by domestic and
large institutions may led them to be oversized; while small and foreign banks may
still present some potential scale gains.
We observe that size and foreign ownership are important inefficiency drivers
in all the models. Their effects are negative on cost inefficiency and positive
on profit inefficiency. This suggests that large and foreign banks are more cost
efficient but less profit efficient than their counterparts. Previous studies have
found similar effects. Chen and Liao (2011) found that foreign banks perform
better than local banks because they may deal better with risk exposure given
cheaper access to funding sources or more diversification. Fries and Taci (2005)
found similar results for banks with majority of foreign ownership in emerging
economies. Regarding size, previous studies have found that large institutions
tend to exhibit greater efficiency associated to higher scale economies (Bos and
Kool, 2006; Glass and McKillop, 2006; Wheelock and Wilson, 2012; Hughes and
Mester, 2013). In previous applications to Colombian banks, both foreign and
large banks have also been found to be more cost efficient than local and small
banks (Moreno and Estrada, 2013; Gala´n et al., 2014c; Sarmiento et al., 2013).
However, the fact that larger banks are found to operate on decreasing returns to
scale while they exhibit higher cost efficiency may suggest that those banks benefit
from lower funding costs. This relatively advantage over smaller banks has been
recently reported in the literature as evidence of the too-important-to-fail dilemma
where larger banks take advantage of their size for funding at lower cots and for
14Small and large banks are those below and above the median of the total assets, respectively.
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taking on more risk (IMF, 2014; Santos, 2014). Bertay et al. (2013) analyzed a
large sample of banks for 90 countries during the period 1992-2011 and found that
banks interest costs tend to decline with systemic size. This result was found for
all banks except for those with very low capitalization level. Interestingly, as it
will be mentioned further, we also find that lower capitalization (i.e. higher capital
risk exposure) is associated with lower cost and profit efficiency.
Regarding the effects of risk exposure, posterior results for risk coefficients and
model comparison indicators lead to similar conclusions in both the cost and profit
models.15 That is, models including risk exposure improve from a model omitting
these variables; and, from these models, the one including these covariates in the
inefficiency distribution exhibit better fit and predictive performance. Moreover,
no important effects of any risk measure are observed when they are modeled in
the frontier, while some risk exposures are found to be very relevant when they
are included in the inefficiency distribution. This suggests that risk-taking is an
important driver of banks inefficiency. Also, cost and profit efficiency are found to
be over and under estimated, respectively, when risk exposure measures are not
modeled in the inefficiency distribution.
We identify that greater capital risk exposures lead to lower cost and profit
efficiency. There is evidence showing that highly capitalized banks tend to be
more efficient than thinly capitalized banks (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997). This
may be associated to the fact that lower capitalized banks may increase their risk
of insolvency due to credit losses or sudden security price deterioration.16
Credit and market risks are also found to be key drivers of profit efficiency,
providing evidence in favor of risk-taking in both the credit and securities markets.
This may be related to the skimping hypothesis in Berger and DeYoung (1997),
showing that when banks relax credit standards (or expend lower resources in
the analysis of loan applications) they try to increase their quantity of loans and
perform better (more profitable). This ex-ante credit risk is reflected in a growing
proportion of risky loans which also tend to increase during periods of lower interest
rates (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2013). A similar strategy is adopted by banks in the
securities market. Banks with a higher risk appetite may choose to produce less
fixed interest bearing loans and engage more in securities, increasing their market
risk exposure (Mester, 2008).
15Lower values for DIC3 and LPS indicate better fit and predictive performance.
16See evidence for the U.S banks in Hughes and Mester (2001) and for German banking
industry in Koetter (2008). However, Altunbas et al. (2007) find the opposite relationship for
European banks (i.e. less efficient banks hold more capital and more liquid assets than higher
efficient banks).
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5.1. Analysis of risk random coefficients
Results of DIC3 and LPS favor our proposed inefficiency specification with
random coefficients for risk covariates in both cost and profit models. These results
suggest not only that risk exposure measures are important inefficiency drivers
but also that risk has different effects on cost and profit inefficiency of banks with
different characteristics.
Figures 1 and 4 exhibit the posterior distributions of the four risk exposure
bank-specific coefficients averaged by groups of banks in models C4 and P4, re-
spectively. The analysis is performed by groups of banks with different character-
istics of size (small vs large banks), ownership (domestic vs foreign banks), and
involvement in M&A processes (merged vs non-merged banks). We observe two
main results when heterogeneity in the way risk affects inefficiency is accounted
for: firstly, some groups of banks are more affected than others at the same risk
exposure levels; and secondly, some types of risk become relevant as inefficiency
drivers for some groups of banks.
Figure 1: Average posterior distributions of risk random coefficients by groups of banks under
cost model C4
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In particular, credit risk is identified as a key cost inefficiency driver for foreign
and non-merged banks, in the sense that higher exposures to credit risk reduce cost
efficiency of these types of banks. Likewise, liquidity exposure is only identified as
having relevant negative effects on cost inefficiency of foreign banks. Moreover, the
effect on domestic banks is almost nonexistent. This result indicates that holding
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less liquid assets is more costly for foreign banks which could be associated to their
incentives to engage on more risk-taking. Regarding capital risk exposures, the
positive effects on cost inefficiency are similar between types of banks. However,
increasing capital in the same proportion is more likely to affect more non-merged
institutions. Finally, market risk is not relevant for any of the analyzed types of
banks following the conclusion obtained from the fixed coefficients model.
Regarding bank-specific effects of risk on profit efficiency, it is observed in
Figure 4 that credit risk affects more large, foreign and merged banks. Thus,
these types of banks benefit more by assuming the same credit risk exposures than
their counterparts. On the other hand, small, domestic and non-merged banks
find more benefits when they increase market risk in the same proportions. As to
liquidity and capital exposures, no differences are identified between these groups
of banks. As in the fixed coefficients model, liquidity continues to be non-relevant
explaining profit efficiency; while increasing capital has similar positive effects on
profit inefficiency for all banks.
Figure 2: Average posterior distributions of risk random coefficients by groups of banks under
profit model P4
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5.2. Analysis of efficiency
The most important changes in the posterior efficiency estimations are observed
when the model is allowed to estimate bank-specific risk coefficients in the ineffi-
ciency distribution. In these cases, the average posterior cost efficiency decreases
and profit efficiency increases with respect to the other models. This suggests
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that considering heterogeneity in the way risk affects inefficiency has important
effects on estimations. It is also observed that in both cost and profit models, the
dispersion of the posterior efficiency presents important increases in the random
coefficient models. This suggests that these models are recognizing differences be-
tween banks in terms of their risk exposure and that these differences have effects
on their efficiency estimations.
Figures 3 and 4 exhibit the average posterior distributions of cost and profit effi-
ciency, respectively. Posterior efficiency is analyzed by groups of banks and results
from models with fixed and random coefficients of risk covariates are presented.
Figure 3: Average posterior distributions of cost efficiency by groups of banks in Models C3 and
C4
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
M
o
d
e
l 
C
3
F
ix
e
d
 C
o
e
ff
.
Small vs Large Banks
 
 
Small Large
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Domestic vs Foreign Banks
 
 
Domestic Foreign
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Merged vs Non−merged Banks
 
 
Merged Non−merged
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
5
10
15
20
25
M
o
d
e
l 
C
4
R
a
n
d
o
m
 C
o
e
ff
.
 
 
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
5
10
15
20
25
 
 
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
5
10
15
20
25
 
 
In general, bank-specific characteristics are found to be relevant factors that
differentiate banks performance. Large banks exhibit higher costs efficiency levels
than small banks in both fixed and random coefficients models. However, the ran-
dom coefficient models show a higher difference among large and small institutions.
As we mentioned before, a possible explanation for the differences between banks
with different size may be associated to the fact that large banks are considered by
creditors as too-important-to-fail and then, they are willing to offer funds at lower
costs. In the case of small banks the result can be seen as opposite in the sense
that creditors and depositors may ask for higher returns from those “risky-small-
banks” as a way to exert market discipline (see evidence in Wheelock and Wilson,
2012; Bertay et al., 2013; Hughes and Mester, 2013; IMF, 2014). Regarding affili-
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ation, domestic institutions present higher costs efficiency than foreign banks but
this difference is only important under the random coefficients model, suggesting
that domestic banks benefit from the differences in the way credit and liquidity
risk affect these banks. On the other hand, no important differences are observed
in cost efficiency between merged and non-merged banks. As presented further,
differences are more evident in the evolution of their efficiency.
Regarding profit efficiency, the random coefficients model identifies some differ-
ences in the location and dispersion of the posterior efficiency distributions. The
main difference in profit efficiency is observed between domestic and foreign banks.
Domestic banks almost double profit efficiency of foreign banks in both models.
Figure 4: Average posterior distributions of profit efficiency by groups of banks in Models P3
and P4
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Finally, focusing on the results of our preferred models with random coefficients,
the evolution of cost and profit efficiency over time is presented in Figure 5 by
groups of banks. Small banks have been more volatile in both cost and profit
efficiency over time, while large banks have been more stable and present higher
cost efficiency during all the period. This may suggest that large banks are less
sensitive to environmental conditions. Foreign banks present lower profit efficiency
with the lowest value presented in 2008 coinciding with the global financial crisis.
This suggest that foreign institutions could be affected by their operations and
investments in international markets. Nevertheless, in the last years, foreign banks
22
exhibit an increasing trend in profit efficiency and their scores are very close to
those of local banks.
Regarding merged banks, we observe that they present decreases in cost and
profit efficiency in the first years after these processes have been carried out (2005 -
2006). However, in the last two years they seem to recover part of these losses. This
pattern was also found in Gala´n et al. (2014c) by using an input-oriented technical
efficiency approach under a dynamic SFA model. They find that merged banks
are able to recover very fast their efficiency levels and present higher efficiency
than non-merged institutions due to lower adjustment costs. Cuesta and Orea
(2002) had also found a similar pattern in merged Spanish banks after evaluating
output-oriented technical efficiency. Here, we find that these effects are even more
evident when we assess integrally costs and revenues in a profit efficiency analysis.
Figure 5: Evolution of mean posterior cost and profit efficiency by groups of banks in random
coefficient models
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6. Concluding remarks
Risk-taking is an inherent condition of the banking business. However, tradi-
tional studies on bank efficiency had assumed that risk is incorporated on bank
output without explicitly modeling its role in explaining inefficiency. Recent stud-
ies show that failing to account for risk-taking leads to biased estimations of bank
efficiency as well as mislead estimates of scale economies and cost elasticities. Like-
wise, the literature has focused mainly on credit risk, omitting other important
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risks faced by banks.
We present a stochastic frontier model, which is able to model unobserved het-
erogeneity sources through random coefficients in the inefficiency distribution and
incorporates bank-specific characteristics and measures of credit, liquidity, capital
and market risk exposures. It also provides the first empirical evidence on the role
of bank risk-taking in the inefficiency of the Colombian banking industry. This
is particularly important because during the last years the banking industry in
this emerging economy has expanded their financial services along with greater
credit and market risk exposure. Recent studies on efficiency of the Colombian
banking sector have showed an improvement on technical efficiency and produc-
tivity change among banks. However none of these studies have incorporated the
impact of bank risk-taking behavior on inefficiency, which plays a major role in
the banking production.
Our findings remark the importance of considering different types of bank
risk exposure as cost and profit inefficiency drivers. In particular, large and for-
eign banks exhibit higher costs efficiency, which are unrelated to scale economies,
suggesting evidence of too-important-to-fail considerations that may benefit large
banks from lower deposit and funding costs. Regarding risk effects on inefficiency,
we find that greater exposures to credit and market risks are found to be key
drivers of profit efficiency. These findings suggest that banks may have incentives
for risk-taking in both the credit and securities markets. We also find evidence to
support that lower capital risk (i.e. higher capitalization) leads to higher efficiency
in both costs and profits. Finally, our proposal to include random coefficients in
the inefficiency capture differences in the way risk affects cost and profit efficiency
of banks involved in M&A processes, and banks with different size and type of own-
ership. We identify large, foreign and merged banks to benefit more from taking
on the same credit risk exposures than their counterparts; while small, domestic
and non-merged banks institutions take advantage of higher market risk.
Banks cost and profit efficiency under risk-taking may be a useful indicator for
financial stability considerations given that banks with lower efficiency have been
found to be more prone to future bank fails (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). In this
context, regulators should not only take into account the impact of requirements in
capital and liquid assets on cost and profit efficiency of banks, but also that these
policies have different, and sometimes opposite, effects on banks with different
characteristics.
Moreover, the fact that large and merged banks are found to face lower costs
and to have incentives to take on more risk in credit and securities markets consti-
tute a signal for regulators to monitor the behavior of these type of banks and their
riskiness. Regulators should also consider alternative measures to limit risk-taking
incentives associated to the fact that larger banks exploit the benefits from being
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considered as too-important-to-fail. This is even more important given the recent
local expansion of financial conglomerates, which makes more difficult for regu-
lators to monitor their behavior and may enhance regulatory arbitrage through
non-banking institutions boosting financial fragility. The lack of market discipline
by depositors and the difficulties of regulators to be effective monitors of banks
has enhanced the role of market-based-monitoring. Under this approach, riskier
banks are forced to pay higher funding costs given that their peers are able to
identify those banks in the market. Work is currently in progress on this area and
on the relationship between risk-taking and the too-important-to-fail dilemma in
interbank markets.
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